Differentiating Legislative from Nonlegislative Rules: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis by Ben Zur, Nadav D.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 5 Article 12 
2019 
Differentiating Legislative from Nonlegislative Rules: An Empirical 
and Qualitative Analysis 
Nadav D. Ben Zur 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nadav D. Ben Zur, Differentiating Legislative from Nonlegislative Rules: An Empirical and Qualitative 
Analysis, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 2125 (2019). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss5/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2125 
NOTES 
DIFFERENTIATING LEGISLATIVE FROM 
NONLEGISLATIVE RULES:  AN EMPIRICAL 
AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Nadav D. Ben Zur* 
 
The elusive distinction between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules 
has frustrated courts, motivated voluminous scholarly debate, and ushered 
in a flood of litigation against administrative agencies.  In the absence of 
U.S. Supreme Court guidance on the proper demarcating line, circuit courts 
have adopted various tests to ascertain a rule’s proper classification. 
This Note analyzes all 241 cases in which a circuit court has used one or 
more of the enunciated tests to differentiate legislative from nonlegislative 
rules.  These opinions come from every one of the thirteen circuits and span 
the period of the early 1950s through 2018.  This Note identifies six different 
tests that courts have employed in this effort and offers a qualitative and 
empirical analysis of each.  The qualitative analysis explains the underlying 
premise of the tests, articulates their merits and shortcomings, and considers 
how courts have applied them to particular disputes.  The empirical portion 
of this Note uses regression analysis to ascertain how using or rejecting one 
or more of the tests affects a court’s determination of whether the rule is 
legislative or nonlegislative. 
This Note classifies the different tests into two categories:  public-focused 
tests and agency-focused tests.  These two categories are defined by a 
principle that permeates administrative law jurisprudence:  achieving a 
proper balance between efficient agency rulemaking and maintaining a 
proper check against unconstrained agency action.  These two categories 
thus defined, this Note proposes a balanced approach that incorporates 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, or the 
“Act”)1 in 1946, courts, scholars, and litigants have been debating how to 
differentiate between legislative (e.g., notice-and-comment rules) and 
nonlegislative rules (e.g., interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and 
procedural rules).2  This effort has been described as the most vexing, 
important, and litigated issue in the rulemaking process today.3 
Under the APA, administrative agencies must comply with various 
procedural requirements when issuing legislative rules,4 known as “notice-
and-comment rulemaking.”5  Notice and comment is a form of public 
participation that allows affected parties and individuals to submit comments, 
data, and suggestions for alternative solutions with respect to problems that 
agencies are considering regulating.6  These procedures, however, are both 
resource-intensive and time-consuming, lasting an average of more than 460 
days per promulgated rule.7 
But agencies may avoid these hurdles by relying on the APA’s exemptions 
for nonlegislative rules.8  The APA allows agencies to issue interpretive 
rules, general statements of policy, and procedural rules without the burden 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.9  Yet, while the Act provides these 
 
 1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
 2. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the 
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) (“There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in 
the field of administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules.”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing 
Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000) (“For over 
fifty years, courts and commentators have struggled to identify, and to apply, criteria that are 
appropriate to distinguish between legislative rules and interpretative rules.”). 
 3. Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 
265 (2018). 
 4. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (“‘[R]ule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and future effect.”).  Under the commonly accepted 
Department of Justice definition, legislative rules are said to carry “the force and effect of 
law.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
 5. In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the 
requirements for formal rulemaking procedures. 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973).  That decision, 
scholars have noted, marked the “ascendancy of the notice and comment approach for 
rulemaking.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 948 (5th ed. 2014). 
 6. White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 7. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011). 
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
 9. Id. 
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notable exceptions, it perplexingly fails to define them.10  The Act does not 
explain the meaning of or the difference between “legislative rules,” 
“interpretive rules,” “general statements of policy,” and “rules of agency 
procedure.”11 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the field of APA 
exemptions is emblematic of the Court’s muddled jurisprudence on this 
issue.  In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,12 a trade organization argued 
that the Department of Labor (DOL) violated the procedural requirements of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.13  Over the course of a decade, the DOL 
had issued various opinion letters determining whether mortgage loan 
officers qualify for an exemption from the overtime pay requirement under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.14  In 2010 the DOL abandoned its previous 
positions and concluded that mortgage loan officers were not subject to the 
exemption.  In response, petitioners argued that the new position constituted 
a legislative rule and was therefore procedurally deficient and invalid.15 
During oral arguments, Justice Kagan asked the government to respond to 
the growing concern that “agencies more and more are using interpretive 
rules and are using guidance documents to make law and that . . . it is 
essentially an end run around the notice and comment provisions.”16 
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor did acknowledge the 
difficult task of differentiating the two types of rules and the long-standing 
academic debate on the matter.17  But hopes that the Court would provide a 
conclusive test were dashed when the majority held that “[w]e need not, and 
do not, wade into that debate here.”18 
The lack of Supreme Court guidance, coupled with the arduous process of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking,19 have raised the specter, as adverted to by 
Justice Kagan,20 that agencies have been labeling legislative rules as 
nonlegislative in an attempt to circumvent the APA.21  As Professor Robert 
Anthony remarked: 
 
 10. See id. §§ 551–559. 
 11. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & KRISTIN E. HICKMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.5 
(6th ed. 2018). 
 12. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 13. Id. at 1204–05. 
 14. Id. at 1204. 
 15. Id. at 1204–05. 
 16. Oral Argument at 11:27, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 
13–1041, 13–1052), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1041 [https://perma.cc/D6E2-
7HLV]. 
 17. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204. 
 18. Id.; see also id. at 1204–06 (holding that agencies do not have to undergo notice-and-
comment procedures when altering a previous interpretive rule). 
 19. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 513. 
 20. Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 11:27. 
 21. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL AGENCY 
GUIDANCE:  AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2017) (explaining that “[t]he use of guidance 
as a binding norm undermines the mandate of the APA that general binding policies should 
be made only through the exacting procedures of legislative rulemaking”). 
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If such nonlegislative actions can visit upon the public the same practical 
effects as legislative actions do, but are far easier to accomplish, agency 
heads . . . will be enticed into using them.  Where an agency can 
nonlegislatively impose standards and obligations that as a practical matter 
are mandatory, it eases its work greatly in several undesirable ways.22 
This Note analyzes the debate over the proper demarcating line between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules both qualitatively and empirically.  The 
qualitative portion outlines six tests that circuit courts have considered when 
determining whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative.  It reviews the 
justifications for and ramifications of each test, and it offers a classification 
of the tests into two categories of analysis:  agency-focused tests and public-
focused tests.  Constructing these binary categories facilitates useful 
reflection about competing notions of administrative law jurisprudence.23 
The empirical portion analyzes 241 cases from across the thirteen circuit 
courts.  In these opinions, courts have relied on one or more of the six tests a 
total of 588 times.24  The empirical analysis in particular attempts to offer a 
new contribution to this rich area of literature by measuring whether a court 
employing or rejecting a certain test is more or less likely to find that a rule 
is legislative. 
This Note is organized as follows:  Part I.A provides a brief history of key 
developments in this field and highlights the legal and academic debate 
around articulating and implementing a proper test to distinguish between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules.  Part I.B outlines the six tests circuit 
courts employ in this effort and considers the tests’ merits and shortcomings 
in turn.  Part I.C suggests a division of the tests into binary categories of 
public-focused and agency-focused tests.  Then, Part II.A describes the 
methodology used in this Note’s empirical analysis, and Part II.B presents 
the results.  Finally, Part III suggests a balanced approach consisting of 
elements from both the public-focused and agency-focused categories and 
proposes informed refinements for some of the tests identified. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE OR NONLEGISLATIVE?:  THE CHALLENGE OF 
ARTICULATING A TEST 
The APA establishes procedural requirements for agencies to follow when 
they formulate, amend, or repeal a rule.25  Compliance with the APA, as 
established in the Act and in subsequent cases, requires a four-step process.26  
First, the agency must issue a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the 
 
 22. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and 
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1317 
(1992).  But see Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 65, 90, 127 (2015) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that agencies avoid 
rulemaking procedures primarily due to concerns about future litigation). 
 23. Infra Part I.C. 
 24. Data summarizing the results, as well as individual case coding for the tests relied 
upon for all 241 cases, are on file with the author. 
 25. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015). 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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Federal Register.27  Second, the agency must give interested parties an 
opportunity to participate “through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments.”28  Third, as the Second Circuit instructed in United States v. 
Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,29 relevant submissions must be given due 
consideration and may require specific treatment.30  Lastly, when 
promulgating a final rule, the agency must include a concise general 
statement of the rule’s basis and purpose.31 
Agencies may avoid these requirements by relying on the APA’s 
exceptions for interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of 
agency procedure.32  These exceptions, as courts have noted, are both key to 
efficient agency operation and compatible with the purposes of the APA.33  
As the Sixth Circuit explained, the three exceptions “reflect[] the idea that 
public input will not help an agency make the legal determination of what 
the law already is.”34  They also facilitate important agency work by 
providing “a degree of flexibility where ‘substantive rights are not at 
stake.’”35 
But as Perez noted, the terms are “not further defined by the APA, and 
[their] precise meaning is the source of much scholarly and judicial 
debate.”36  A 1947 Department of Justice manual (the “Manual”) provided 
an early guide to the APA’s definitional void and proved influential with 
courts.37  The Manual defines legislative rules as rules “other than 
organizational or procedural . . . issued by an agency pursuant to statutory 
authority and which implement the statute” and “have the force and effect of 
law.”38  The Manual defines interpretive rules as rules “issued . . . to advise 
the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it 
administers.”39  Finally, the Manual defines general statements of policy as 
“statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the 
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”40  
 
 27. Id. § 553(b) (“The notice should include (1) a statement of the time, place, and nature 
of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved.”). 
 28. Id. § 553(c). 
 29. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 30. Id. at 251 (detailing proper agency consideration of submitted data). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 32. Id. § 553(b)(A). 
 33. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that 
the function of the exemption for general policy statements is to allow agencies to announce 
their future intentions without binding themselves). 
 34. Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 35. Sentara-Hampton Gen. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1045). 
 36. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015). 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.  As Justice Antonin Scalia noted, the Court has 
“repeatedly given great weight” to the Manual in its decisions on the issue. Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 38. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 30 n.3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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But these definitions, as commentators have noted, are of modest utility,41 
and the challenge of finding a line between legislative and nonlegislative 
rules persists to this day.42 
A.  The APA:  Procedural Requirements and Evolving Doctrine 
Congress implemented the APA as a response to growing concerns about 
administrative overreach during the New Deal.43  As the Supreme Court 
noted shortly after the Act’s implementation:  “The [APA] was framed 
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a 
check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to 
excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.”44  And, as 
Judge Richard A. Posner noted, in passing the Act, Congress reached a 
“historic compromise.”45  The APA was, on the one hand, an acceptance of 
the administrative state as an organ of federal lawmaking and, on the other, 
a significant check on administrative functions through various procedural 
constraints.46 
Chief among these constraints is the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
structure.  By mandating this procedure, Congress pursued several goals:  
(1) “to reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties”;47 
(2) to assure “that the agency will have before it the facts and information 
relevant to a particular administrative problem”;48 and (3) to facilitate a 
process through which agencies engage in “due deliberation” before 
implementing regulations with the force and effect of law.49 
Courts have also maintained that the process is a necessary check on 
agency power.  “The APA notice and comment procedures exist for good 
reason:  to ensure that unelected administrators, who are not directly 
accountable to the populace, are forced to justify their quasi-legislative 
rulemaking before an informed and skeptical public.”50 
 
 41. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules 
and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 533 (1977). 
 42. See generally Pierce, supra note 2. 
 43. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 937 (“[W]ith the enormous expansion of 
executive branch and independent agencies during the New Deal, some private sector 
observers voiced increasing alarm about the bureaucracy’s authority and influence over the 
actions of individuals and entities.”). 
 44. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950). 
 45. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
953, 954 (1997). 
 46. See Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern Administrative Procedure:  
The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 52–53 (2016) (explaining that “[t]he 
APA is best understood as the consolidation and rationalization of the administrative state, not 
as its repudiation”). 
 47. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 48. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Guardian 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
1978)). 
 49. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996). 
 50. New Jersey v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1262, 1281 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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A celebrated opinion by Judge Posner articulated these justifications.  In 
Hoctor v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,51 the Seventh Circuit had to 
determine whether a Department of Agriculture rule—mandating a minimum 
fence requirement when constructing cages for wild animals—was 
legislative or interpretive.  In holding that the rule was legislative, and that it 
therefore had to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking, Judge Posner 
wrote: 
There are thousands of animal dealers, and some unknown fraction of these 
face the prospect of having to tear down their existing fences and build new, 
higher ones at great cost.  The concerns of these dealers are legitimate 
and . . . the agency was obliged to listen to them before settling on a final 
rule.52 
The following sections review the common distinction between legislative 
and nonlegislative rules, the D.C. Circuit’s influential decision that shaped 
the modern debate over the issue, and the Supreme Court’s most recent 
discussion of legislative and nonlegislative rules. 
1.  The Common Distinction:  The Rule’s Legal Effect 
While the debate continues, scholars and courts seem to have reached a 
consensus on one fundamental distinction between legislative and 
nonlegislative rules:  the former have a binding effect while the latter do 
not.53  As Michael Asimow explains, the prevailing standard for 
distinguishing legislative from interpretive rules is the “‘legal effect’ test.”54  
If a rule makes new law, instead of interpreting existing law, then that rule is 
legislative.55  Similarly, and pre-dating the APA, the Supreme Court 
announced in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States56 that 
regulations altering the affected public’s behavior “have the force of law.”57 
While that makes some intuitive sense, this distinction is difficult to apply 
and often produces inconsistent results.58  As Professor Mark Seidenfeld 
argues, beyond the consensus that nonlegislative rules lack a binding legal 
force, ambiguity as to what legal force means and how it can be measured 
 
 51. 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 52. Id. at 171. 
 53. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) (“It has been 
established . . . that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and 
effect of law.’”); Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 
658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a legislative rule has “the force of law”); see also 
PIERCE & HICKMAN, supra note 11, § 4.3. 
 54. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 
381, 394. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
 57. Id. at 418. 
 58. Franklin, supra note 2, at 288. 
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“has confused the courts.”59  Indeed, courts have often admitted that the 
distinction is “fuzzy,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in considerable smog.”60 
2.  American Mining Congress 
In the D.C. Circuit’s influential American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety 
& Health Administration61 decision, the appellate court articulated its task as 
determining whether a rule has “the force of law.”62  The case concerned a 
DOL interpretation of a statute mandating that mine operators report certain 
diagnoses of occupational illnesses.63  The Department issued several “policy 
letters” stating that certain x-ray results constitute a diagnosis and therefore 
must be reported.64  Replying to the petitioners’ challenge, the DOL 
defended its actions by arguing that the policy letters were interpretive rules 
exempt from notice-and-comment procedures.65 
To resolve the challenge, the court introduced three lines of inquiry:  
(1) What is the agency label?  Did the agency note that the rule is 
nonlegislative, or did it announce the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) or go through notice and comment?66  (2) Has the agency created new 
rights or duties for the regulated public?67  Did the challenged rule alter the 
regulatory landscape such that parties must abide by a new statutory 
standard?68  (3) Was the agency clarifying or supplying an ambiguous statute 
with greater detail?69  An agency, after all, may provide new definitions to a 
statute and still remain within the domain of nonlegislative rules.70 
Though American Mining Congress stands as perhaps the most influential 
articulation of the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules,71 
scholars have debated its merits.  Professor Richard Pierce argued that 
American Mining Congress is a sound opinion that provides a revealing 
test.72  He noted that, if widely adopted, the tests it outlined would 
 
 59. Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 335 (2011). 
 60. Pierce, supra note 2, at 547–48 (first quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 
1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); then quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); and then quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 61. 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 62. Id. at 1109 (quoting Nat’l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 787–88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
 63. Id. at 1107. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1108. 
 66. Id. at 1109. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1109–10 (explaining that if a new rule is “irreconcilable” with an old legislative 
rule, the new rule is legislative). 
 69. Id. at 1110 (explaining that if a new rule explains a preexisting duty, the new rule is 
interpretive). 
 70. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 71. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 561 (noting that the American Mining Congress opinion 
is widely praised in casebooks and treatises and “was also followed both within the circuit and 
by other circuits”). 
 72. Id. at 548, 560–61. 
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significantly help to remediate the “the rampant confusion and 
inconsistency” that pervades this area of administrative law.73 
But Professor Richard Manning disagreed and argued that, far from being 
the ultimate test, American Mining Congress makes it “difficult, at best, to 
draw meaningful distinctions between interpretive and legislative rules.”74  
In sum, Manning warned that the D.C. Circuit’s approach to identifying 
legislative rules “may necessitate reliance on little more than an I-know-it-
when-I-see-it test.”75 
3.  The Current Landscape:  Perez 
Though the Supreme Court has at times referred to the task of 
differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules,76 it has avoided tackling 
the distinction directly and has instead left the circuit courts in their current 
disarray.  In Perez, the Court persisted in its avoidance and announced that it 
would not wade into the debate over the line between legislative and 
nonlegislative rules.77  Still, the majority and concurring opinions provided 
some insightful commentary on the issue. 
The respondents raised three arguments pertaining to the APA and its 
nonlegislative rules exceptions:  (1) text, (2) precedent, and (3) policy 
considerations.78  Helpfully, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion replied to 
each, shedding important light on the Court’s interpretation of the APA.79  
First, the respondents argued that when an agency significantly changes a 
prior interpretation, it amends that regulation and must undergo notice-and-
comment procedures.80  But the Court disagreed.81  It distinguished 
“amending” from “interpreting” and held that agencies may freely engage in 
acts of interpretation even when that produces new understandings of the 
underlying statute.82  The majority reasoned that just as courts do not amend 
a statute when they interpret its text, so too can agencies interpret a regulation 
without effectively amending the underlying law.83  Justice Thomas 
concurred, stating that “[a]n agency’s substantial revision of its interpretation 
of a regulation does not amount to an ‘amendment’ of the regulation as that 
word is used in the [APA].”84 
 
 73. Id. at 548. 
 74. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 922 (2004). 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 927. 
 76. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 88 (1995); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 314 (1979). 
 77. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015). 
 78. Consolidated Brief of Respondent at 21, 23–25, 28–29, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052). 
 79. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1207–08 (comparing Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “amend” and 
“interpret”). 
 83. Id. at 1208. 
 84. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Perez therefore appears to expand the realm of interpretive rules by 
allowing agencies to offer a new understanding of a statute, even when that 
new understanding sets forth new rights or duties.85  The Court emphasized 
that the respondents’ argument conflicts with the “longstanding recognition” 
that interpretive rules cannot change the regulation they interpret because 
interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law.86 
Second, the respondents pointed to Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial 
Hospital,87 in which the Court stated that when agencies adopt new positions 
inconsistent with existing regulations, they must comply with notice-and-
comment procedures.88  But Justice Sotomayor dismissed that portion of the 
opinion as “dictum” and cautioned that Guernsey Memorial Hospital’s 
reasoning only applies when the amendment refers to rules originally 
promulgated as legislative.89 
Finally, the respondents warned that policy considerations militate against 
permitting an amendment through an interpretive rule.90  They contended 
that overruling Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.91 would 
further entrench the practice of issuing nonlegislative rules to skirt the APA 
and unexpectedly alter important regulations.92  But the Court rejected that 
argument and highlighted that the APA contains other constraints on agency 
procedures, such as the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.93  
Accordingly, the Court held that petitioners cannot rely on newly erected 
additions to notice-and-comment rulemaking.94 
In his concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia took issue with the majority’s 
construction of Congress’s intent in framing the exemptions to the APA.95  
“This concession,” referring to the APA’s exemption of interpretive rules, 
“was meant to be more modest in its effects than it is today.”96  Lamenting 
the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence, Justice Scalia criticized the 
Court’s approach to the issue and, specifically, its reading of the APA’s 
contemplation of the proper role for the courts.  Namely, while the Act holds 
 
 85. Id. at 1207–08 (majority opinion).  But Perez could also be read more narrowly given 
that the case involved an amendment to an interpretive rule. Id. at 1205.  Unfortunately, the 
Court was less than careful in its terminology.  For example, it held that an agency can interpret 
a “regulation” without effectively amending the underlying source of law. Id. at 1208.  It is 
unclear, however, whether by “regulation” the Court was referring to an interpretive rule, a 
legislative rule, or both. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 514 U.S. 87 (1995); see also Consolidated Brief of Respondent, supra note 78, at 26. 
 88. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 100. 
 89. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209. 
 90. Consolidated Brief of Respondent, supra note 78, at 30 (arguing that limitations on 
amending interpretive rules “prevent fickle agency flip-flopping on established positions”). 
 91. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir 1997), abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 92. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1209. 
 93. Id. (explaining that the APA allows courts to find that an agency action is arbitrary 
and capricious and therefore in violation of the Act). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. 
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that courts, rather than agencies, will resolve statutory ambiguities, the 
Supreme Court has allowed agencies to authoritatively resolve ambiguities 
in statutes.97 
Consequently, Justice Scalia explained, agencies now use interpretive 
rules to bind the public in one of two ways.  First, as a result of Auer v. 
Robbins,98 any interpretive rule that meets certain conditions—such as 
reasonableness—is “every bit as binding as a substantive rule.”99  Second, 
because agencies are cognizant of the expanding domain of interpretive rules, 
they “need only write substantive rules more broadly and vaguely, leaving 
plenty of gaps to be filled later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice 
and comment.”100  These developments, the concurrence concluded, shifted 
the original balance the APA struck with respect to interpretive rules.101 
B.  The Six Tests 
From the early “substantial impact” test102 to the variety of tests articulated 
in American Mining Congress,103 six different inquiries have defined the 
judicial approach to differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules.  This 
section outlines the tests as they appear in case law and highlights the 
scholarly debate surrounding each. 
In short, the six tests are:  (1) the “agency label” test, which relies on the 
agency’s own characterization of the rule—as legislative or nonlegislative—
as a guide to the rule’s proper classification; (2) the “clarification” test, which 
asks whether a rule merely provides greater clarity to an existing regulation; 
(3) the “acting pursuant to statutory delegation” test, which assesses whether 
the agency has the required authority from Congress to implement legislative 
rules; (4) the “agency binding” test, under which a rule is more likely to be 
deemed legislative if it has effectively limited an agency administrator’s 
discretion; (5) the “create new rights or duties” test, which assesses whether 
an agency has shifted the regulatory landscape by creating new rights or 
duties for the affected public; and (6) the “substantial impact” test, under 
which a rule with a significant impact on the regulated public will more 
readily be found to require notice-and-comment procedures. 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 99. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 
(holding that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation).  As this Note is being prepared for publication, 
the Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on the question of whether the Court should 
overturn Auer. See Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15 (U.S. cert. granted Dec. 10, 2018). 
 100. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 103. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109–12 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
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1.  Agency Label 
The “agency label” test looks to the agency’s own classification of the rule 
in dispute.104  This, in turn, introduces a rebuttable presumption that a rule is 
nonlegislative if an agency describes it as such, or if the agency forgoes 
publication in the CFR or the Federal Register.105 
This approach is rooted in one of the key tenets of administrative law:  
courts should afford a “presumption of procedural validity” to an 
administrator’s decisions.106  As it pertains to ascertaining a rule’s true 
nature, relying on the agency label is an acknowledgement that the agency is 
the authority best suited to explain why it issued a rule and why it chose to 
implement it in a specific manner.107 
Indeed, courts across the circuits often defer to the label an agency casts 
on its disputed rule and afford it significant weight.  The Second Circuit, for 
example, noted that “[a]n agency’s characterization of a rule is the ‘starting 
point’ for an analysis of its status as legislative or interpretive.”108  Taking 
this proposition to its extreme, the Seventh Circuit held:  “[Petitioner] starts 
from a disadvantage, because . . . we give great weight to an agency’s 
expressed intent.”109  And when the Sixth Circuit decided that a Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) letter was a general statement of 
policy, it noted that the most persuasive factor for its holding was the 
agency’s description of the letter as mere guidance.110 
Other courts, however, afford little or no weight to the agency’s label.  
Some courts have remarked that an agency’s own label is relevant but not 
dipositive111 and that it is the court’s role to look beyond the agency’s 
characterization.112  As the Fifth Circuit stated, courts should be “mindful 
but suspicious of the agency’s own characterization” of a promulgated 
rule.113 
Perhaps most forcefully, one judge argued that relying on this test is an ill-
advised exercise in deference to the agency’s views.  In American Hospital 
 
 104. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1077 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“There are three relevant factors to whether an agency action constitutes 
substantive rulemaking under the APA:  (1) the Agency’s own characterization of the 
action . . . .”). 
 105. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that a regulation was nonlegislative because it “was not published in either the Code 
of Federal Regulations or the Federal Register, providing further evidence that the regulation 
was not intended to be binding”). 
 106. Levin, supra note 3, at 290. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Mejia-Ruiz v. INS, 51 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Metro. Sch. Dist. v. 
Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 109. First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 110. Dyer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 111. See, e.g., Mt. Diablo Hosp. Dist. v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 112. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 176 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 113. Id. at 171. 
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Ass’n v. Bowen,114 a majority of a D.C. Circuit panel determined that a rule 
was nonlegislative after noting that “[t]he real dividing line” between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules is whether the agency published the rule 
in the CFR.115  In dissent, Judge Abner Mikva found this reasoning 
unpersuasive:  “Obviously, an agency that contends its rule is not substantive 
is unlikely to publish that rule in the CFR.  This fact, however, adds nothing 
to the underlying contention.  If the agency’s action is in reality a substantive 
rule, it is no less so for remaining unpublished.”116 
2.  Clarification 
The “clarification” test offers a seemingly obvious inquiry into whether a 
rule is legislative or interpretive.  Interpretive rules, as the name suggests, 
seek to clarify statutes and rules117 and do not “effectuate[ ] [a] change in 
policy or law.”118  Stated differently, interpretative rules reflect what the 
agency’s administrators think a statute or regulation means.119 
Scholars have noted that this test is the most prominent test courts use to 
differentiate interpretive from legislative rules.120  The case law posits 
several articulations of this test.121  These include inquiring whether a rule 
“reminds” parties of their rights and duties or provides an explanation of the 
law that is “fairly encompassed” within the regulation that the agency is 
purporting to elucidate.122 
But some have raised concerns regarding the clarification test’s 
explanatory power.  When a majority of a panel of the Third Circuit applied 
the clarification test and held that an agency’s rule was interpretive,123 Judge 
Richard Nygaard forcefully dissented:  “The majority seems to imply that, 
because the two letters clarify and explain the already-existing [statutes], 
they are interpretive.  But this reasoning proves too much.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to conceive of any nonprocedural regulation that does not in some 
way explain or clarify an existing federal statute.”124 
Nevertheless, the clarification test retains its prominent status in the case 
law,125 and courts often expand the realm of “clarifications” to include 
 
 114. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 115. Id. at 1056. 
 116. Id. at 1060 (Mikva, J., dissenting). 
 117. Brasch v. United States, 41 F. App’x 574, 576 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Guardian Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(“[A]n interpretative rule is merely a clarification or explanation of an existing statute or 
rule.”). 
 118. Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 119. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
 120. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 73–77 (5th ed. 
2012). 
 121. Levin, supra note 3, at 324 (citing Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 
2009); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 124. Id. at 187 (Nygaard, J., dissenting). 
 125. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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additional policy implications.126  Most notably, in American Mining 
Congress the D.C. Circuit held that an interpretation of a statute can include 
a new and more detailed understanding of a regulation because interpretive 
rules must be able to “suppl[y] crisper and more detailed lines than the 
authority being interpreted.”127  Holding to the contrary, the court warned, 
would entail that “no rule could pass as an interpretation of a legislative rule 
unless it were confined to parroting the rule or replacing the original 
vagueness with another.”128 
3.  Pursuant to Statutory Delegation 
Often presented as a threshold test, courts consider whether Congress has 
delegated agencies the power to issue legislative rules and, if so, whether 
agencies relied on that delegation.129  The premise of this test is that an 
agency that lacks legislative power, or an agency that fails to exercise 
delegated legislative power to promulgate a specific rule, necessarily issues 
only interpretive rules.130 
Nevertheless, as some courts note, this inquiry may often be of limited 
value.131  Because agencies have the power to issue interpretive rules, and 
because many agencies also have delegated legislative rulemaking 
authority,132 inquiring whether the agency acted pursuant to statutory 
delegation often fails to illuminate whether the rule is legislative or 
nonlegislative.133 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted the test’s limited value when 
deciding whether a Forest Service memo was a legislative rule:  “[T]he Forest 
Service had the authority to promulgate both legislative and interpretative 
rules concerning surpluses.”134  And because the Service did not indicate on 
which authority it was relying, the court had to look “for other indications” 
of the agency’s intent.135 
 
 126. See Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).  Judge 
Frank Easterbrook explained that though an amendment contained new language, the agency’s 
action helpfully eliminated ambiguity:  “Far better to eliminate than to perpetuate confusion.” 
Id.; see also Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613–14 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “penalizing 
the agency for explaining” a regulation “would be like killing the messenger”). 
 127. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615, 622 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (“When an agency relies on expressly delegated authority to establish policy . . . 
courts generally treat the agency action as legislative, rather than interpretive, rulemaking.”). 
 130. W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g en banc, 
819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[A]lways, the question is whether Congress intended to confer upon the agency the power 
to issue rules having the force and effect of law.”). 
 131. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., id. (finding that the pursuant to statutory delegation test “returns us to the 
starting point . . . what kind of rule does the agency think it has promulgated?”). 
 134. La.-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 135. Id. at 1210. 
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Still, some courts often use this test as an indication of a legislative rule 
when the congressional delegation leaves a regulatory gap for an agency to 
fill.136  As the Fourth Circuit explained, when Congress leaves a gap in the 
statutory scheme, it can expressly delegate legislative authority to the 
agency.137  Then, the agency’s elucidation of that gap through rule 
promulgation will be a legislative rule.138  Applying this distinction, the 
Eighth Circuit found that a rule was interpretive because the agency “was not 
filling in gaps in a statute which granted the agency broad discretion to carry 
out policy.”139 
4.  Agency Binding 
Particularly when determining whether an agency action is a general 
statement of policy or a legislative rule, courts inquire whether the agency 
has restricted its own administrators when executing their administrative 
duties.  As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “The key inquiry . . . is the extent 
to which the challenged policy leaves the agency free to exercise its 
discretion to follow or not to follow that general policy in an individual 
case.”140 
Under the “agency binding” test, an agency action that allows 
administrators to exercise flexibility when making individualized 
determinations is a general statement of policy.141  But when an agency 
action limits administrative discretion or establishes a binding norm, it 
effectively creates a new legislative rule.142  Such actions are legislative, and 
they therefore must undergo notice-and-comment procedures.143  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that the agency binding test is useful because it 
encapsulates the key considerations of notice and comment: 
The significance of this factor is that it reveals whether, if objections to the 
rule cannot be voiced through notice and comment rulemaking . . . there 
will be a subsequent opportunity to object to a specific application of the 
rule.  If an agency, or its official, is bound to apply an airtight rule in a given 
case it is important to allow specific objections prior to promulgation, lest 
these objections be forfeited.144 
 
 136. See, e.g., Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 
464 F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 137. Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 452 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 140. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 141. Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See W.C. v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir.) (“Rules which substantially limit 
an agency’s discretion are generally substantive rules.”), amended on denial of reh’g en banc, 
819 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 144. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1481–82 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
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But some courts and commentators have expressed concern about the 
agency binding test.145  The Federal Circuit, for example, cautioned that an 
agency limiting its administrators’ discretion does not make its actions 
legislative.146  Instead, the court must look at whether that limitation 
adversely affects individual rights and obligations.147  Administrative law 
scholars have also remarked that because the APA does not require notice 
and comment for issuances binding lower-level agency officials, courts 
should not mandate such a process.148  Most forcefully, Richard Pierce 
warned, “With luck, the Supreme Court will have occasion to reject th[is] 
doctrine unequivocally before it begins to have [a] devastating effect.”149 
5.  Create New Rights or Duties 
The test for whether a rule creates new rights or duties, in its various 
formulations, has been the dominant test in this corner of administrative 
law.150  Its origin is rooted in the common distinction between nonlegislative 
and legislative rules, in which the latter, unlike the former, have the force and 
effect of law.151  In articulating this test, courts have noted that legislative 
rules “grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects 
on private interests.”152 
This status can often be gleaned from surveying the regulatory landscape 
before and after the challenged rule.  If a rule creates rights or imposes 
obligations “not already outlined in the law itself,” the rule is legislative.153  
As the D.C. Circuit remarked, this formulation is another way of ascertaining 
“whether the disputed rule really adds content to the governing legal 
norms.”154 
For example, the Third Circuit deemed a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) rule nonlegislative because it did not “impose new duties 
upon regulated parties.”155  In contrast, the Second Circuit held that a 
 
 145. See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a rule may 
bind agency personnel and still remain nonlegislative for purposes of notice and comment). 
 146. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Brief of Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16–
17, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) [hereinafter Brief of 
Administrative Law Scholars]. 
 149. Id. at 17 (alterations in original) (quoting 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 17.3 (5th ed. 2010)). 
 150. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 151. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
 152. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Gray v. Sec’y 
of Veterans Affairs, 875 F.3d 1102, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ultimate focus of the inquiry 
is whether the agency action partakes of the fundamental characteristic of a regulation, i.e., 
that it has the force of law.” (quoting Molycorp Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 
1999)), cert. granted, Gray v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018). 
 153. La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1177–78 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 154. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 155. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 501 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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purported Department of Labor general statement of policy was a legislative 
rule, in part because it “changed existing rights and obligations.”156 
But other reviewing courts considering this test have argued for a more 
limited approach.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, explained that even 
though regulations may have altered administrative duties or created 
hardships, that fact alone does not make them legislative rules.157  Under this 
construction of the test, and given the expanding domain of interpretive 
rules,158 it is becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain whether an 
interpretive rule that altered rights and duties crosses the line into the territory 
of a legislative rule. 
6.  Substantial Impact 
Under the “substantial impact” test, agency actions that significantly 
impact the regulated parties are more likely to constitute a legislative rule 
and should undergo notice-and-comment procedures.  This test has proven 
controversial, with some circuits lauding its value and others forcefully 
rejecting it.159 
The Second,160 Third,161 Fourth,162 and Fifth163 Circuits have considered 
this test relevant.  Most prominently, the Fifth Circuit held that the test in 
determining whether a rule is legislative is the extent to which a rule 
substantially impacts the regulated parties.164  If a new agency policy 
substantially impacts the regulated public, “the new policy is a new 
substantive rule and the agency is obliged, under the APA, to submit the 
change for notice and comment.”165  Conversely, where an agency can 
demonstrate that its actions did not have a considerable impact on regulated 
parties, that may suggest that the agency properly relied on the notice-and-
comment exemptions.166 
 
 156. Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 157. Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997).  The court 
explained that this argument goes into the substantial impact test and is not dispositive. Id. 
 158. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 159. The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have not weighed in on the 
substantial impact test.  The First Circuit cautioned that the test is relevant but not dispositive. 
See Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
 160. Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 168 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 161. Chao v. Rothermel, 327 F.3d 223, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 162. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 163. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 164. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on 
denial of reh’g en banc, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1994). 
 165. Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 166. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153–54 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the Department of Labor’s guidelines were not legislative because they “cast[] 
not the stone of substantial impact”). 
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The Sixth,167 Seventh,168 and Ninth169 Circuits have expressly rejected the 
substantial impact test and have enumerated its shortcomings.  A Sixth 
Circuit case illustrates some of these shortfalls.  In Friedrich v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Services,170 a Medicare recipient sued the Secretary of 
HHS for exempting a critical medical procedure from Medicare coverage.171  
Under Part B of the Medicare Act, the Secretary must deny reimbursement 
for services not “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment” of 
a claimant’s illness or injury.172  Acting accordingly, HHS issued a manual 
stating that the required treatment was neither necessary nor reasonable and 
determined it would no longer be covered under Medicare Part B.173 
Friedrich alleged that the Secretary’s manual was a legislative rule and was 
procedurally invalid because it had not undergone notice and comment.174  
Though HHS countered that the manual was interpretive, the magistrate 
judge relied on the substantial impact test and held that HHS failed to comply 
with the APA procedures for legislative rules.175 
The circuit court disagreed and explained why it was improper to use the 
substantial impact test to distinguish between legislative and interpretive 
rules: 
The plaintiff also contends that the [manual] should be considered 
legislative or substantive because it has a substantial impact on a large 
number of Medicare beneficiaries. . . .  Any determination by the 
Secretary . . . will have a substantial impact on a large number of people.  
The extent of the impact is not an indicative factor in our search for the 
proper characterization of the [manual].176 
Because the Secretary interpreted the meaning of “reasonable and necessary” 
in the Medicare Act, the court reasoned that the substantial impact test would 
not only fail to shed light on a rule’s “true” nature, but it would also point to 
the wrong conclusion.177  Accordingly, it reversed the lower court and held 
that the manual was an interpretive rule, exempt from notice and comment.178 
 
 167. Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that “the level of impact on interested parties is not a factor in correctly classifying a 
rule or regulation”). 
 168. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
“[p]revailing authority rejects the proposition that a rule that has substantial impact is 
necessarily legislative”). 
 169. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 170. 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 171. Id. at 831–32. 
 172. Id. at 830 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)). 
 173. Id. at 831–32. 
 174. Id. at 832. 
 175. Id. at 832–33. 
 176. Id. at 836. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 838. 
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Finally, the D.C. Circuit stands alone among its sister circuits in rejecting 
the substantial impact test for interpretive rules179 but applying it for 
procedural rules.180  This distinction produces a somewhat puzzling 
inconsistency, exacerbated by the harsh critique some panels in the D.C. 
Circuit have resorted to when describing the test.  In Cabais v. Egger,181 the 
court explained that, after Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,182 it is clear that courts may not impose 
procedural requirements on agencies beyond those contemplated by the 
APA.183  The court added that “[t]he words ‘substantial impact’ do not appear 
in the APA” and that the test is considered a “judicial gloss.”184 
But in the context of procedural rules, panels of the D.C. Circuit have noted 
the test’s explanatory power and have distinguished between procedural and 
legislative rules based on the substantial impact test.185  Applying the test to 
a rule under dispute, one court found that the rule was legislative because it 
“substantively affect[ed] the public to a degree sufficient to implicate the 
policy interests animating notice-and-comment rulemaking.”186 
C.  Public-Focused and Agency-Focused Tests 
The six tests so defined, it is analytically insightful and useful to classify 
them into two categories:  (1) agency-focused tests and (2) public-focused 
tests. 
1.  Categorizing the Tests 
The agency label, clarification, pursuant to statutory delegation, and 
agency binding tests are agency-focused.  These tests are typified by a legal 
analysis that focuses on the agency’s action or inaction rather than a rule’s 
effect on the public.  In contrast, the create new rights or duties test and 
substantial impact test are public-focused.  These tests emphasize the adverse 
effect on the regulated public and disregard the agency’s justification for 
choosing certain regulatory measures. 
 
 179. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
impact of a rule has no bearing on whether it is legislative or interpretative; interpretative rules 
may have a substantial impact on the rights of individuals.”). 
 180. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211–12 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“[I]t is apparent that the Directive cannot be considered procedural.  The Directive is intended 
to, and no doubt will, affect the safety practices of thousands of employers.”). 
 181. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 182. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 183. Cabais, 690 F.2d at 237 (citing Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524). 
 184. Id. at 237 n.3.  Still, the court noted that while the test may never constitute an 
independent basis for a determination, it could be “one of several criteria” in determining 
whether a rule should be exempt from the APA. Id. 
 185. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
 186. Id. at 6.  But see Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit has gradually shifted away from the substantial impact test). 
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This binary classification is informed by the underlying premise of each 
test.  In brief, the agency label test187 analyzes the agency’s actions, namely 
the label it has attached to a rule188 and where and whether the rule was 
published.189  The clarification test,190 while turning on a textual analysis, 
assesses whether the agency acted reasonably within the confines of the 
regulation it is claiming to interpret.191  The pursuant to statutory delegation 
test192 focuses on the agency’s mandate from Congress and considers 
whether the agency acted accordingly.193  The agency binding test194 
analyzes the agency’s own administrators and considers whether they are free 
to exercise discretion in future cases.195 
In contrast, the public-focused tests determine whether, and to what extent, 
the public has been affected by a disputed rule.  The create new rights or 
duties test196 determines whether individuals bound by the agency’s 
pronouncement must comply with new rules or restrictions.197  The 
substantial impact test198 identifies the relevant affected party and measures 
the rule’s impact on that party.199  While these tests necessarily consider the 
agency’s action, their primary concern is the regulated public. 
The academic literature provides additional support for the binary 
classification.200  Some scholars emphasize the adverse effect on the 
regulated public.201  Perhaps most famously, Professor Robert Anthony 
explained that while nonlegislative rules do not purport to bind the public, 
 
 187. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 188. See First Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Standard Bank & Tr., 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“[W]e give great weight to an agency’s expressed intent as to whether a rule clarifies existing 
law or substantively changes the law.”). 
 189. See United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he [regulation] was not published in either the Code of Federal Regulations or the Federal 
Register, providing further evidence that the regulation was not intended to be binding.”). 
 190. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 192. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 193. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 194. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 195. See, e.g., Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010); Ryder Truck Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 196. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 197. Compare Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a rule was nonlegislative because “the Commission’s position 
did not constitute a substantive rule having the force and effect of law”), with Xin-Chang 
Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a rule was legislative because 
it “create[d] a new basis on which” the affected public must rely and “change[d] an existing 
policy”). 
 198. See supra Part I.B.6. 
 199. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
 200. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 332 (comparing the works of Robert Anthony and 
Peter L. Strauss); see also Anthony, supra note 22, at 1372 (concluding that numerous policy 
documents bind the public and therefore should be issued as legislative rules); Peter L. Strauss, 
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum:  Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential 
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2001) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit for unduly restricting 
agency use of guidance documents). 
 201. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 345–52. 
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“often an agency will make use of such rules with the purpose or effect of 
imposing a practical norm, if not a legally binding one, upon the regulated 
or benefitted public.”202 
These public-focused tests are motivated by a fear of untoward agency 
actions.  “People rightly resent being surprised by new interpretations that 
the government suddenly pulls out of its nonlegislative hip pocket . . . .  We 
should consider erecting some protections to forestall use of the kinds of 
interpretations that affect the public most harshly.”203 
But other scholars frame their concerns differently and, perhaps as a result, 
reach different conclusions.  As Professor Seidenfeld notes, scholars fearing 
the consequences of the public-focused analysis argue that such tests exert 
an undue burden on agency operation.204  Responding to Anthony’s 
arguments, Professor Donald Elliott, a former general counsel for the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), warned:  “If the courts were to 
follow Anthony . . . the modern administrative process would literally grind 
to a halt.”205  Illustrating this proposition, Professor Thomas McGarity notes 
that “the fact that the air and waters of the United States are still polluted, 
workplaces still dangerous, motor vehicles still unsafe, and consumers still 
being deceived is attributable to the expense and burdensomeness of the 
informal rulemaking process.”206  In sum, these scholars highlight concerns 
about inefficient rulemaking procedures and the perils of halting agency 
action. 
This binary classification is, of course, oversimplifying both the case law 
and academic literature.  Some of these tests do not lend themselves to a clear 
dichotomy.  The clarification test, for example, takes many forms, and courts 
who employ it may explicitly or implicitly refer to the alleged clarification 
as a benefit to the public.207  Additionally, while scholars on both sides of 
the debate highlight different concerns, they do not discredit the contrary 
position.208  Instead, they differ in shaping and achieving the proper balance 
between agency efficiency and public participation. 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, this analysis is qualitatively and 
empirically useful because the tests grouped in the two categories share 
 
 202. Robert A. Anthony, “Well, You Want the Permit, Don’t You?”  Agency Efforts to 
Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32 (1992) (second 
emphasis added) (arguing that the proper test is inquiring whether agencies intended to, and 
effectively did, bind the public). 
 203. Id. at 39. 
 204. See Seidenfeld, supra note 59, at 352. 
 205. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1494 (1992). 
 206. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1391 (1992). 
 207. See, e.g., Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).  
While the court focuses on the agency’s motivations in issuing an interpretive rule, it also 
highlights the benefits to the public:  “[The previous rule] produced confusion inside and 
outside the Department, confusion that the [interpretive rule] eliminates.  Far better to 
eliminate than to perpetuate confusion.” Id. 
 208. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 206, at 1403 (“[I]t is generally a good idea for agencies 
to analyze carefully the consequences of proposed rules on the public and on regulatees . . . .”). 
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common themes that permeate the literature and jurisprudence.  Empirically, 
categorizing the tests into binary categories provides insights that these tests, 
individually considered, could not support.209 
2.  Locating the Dividing Line:  A Hypothesis 
This Note hypothesizes that courts relying on agency-focused tests will be 
more likely to find that a rule is nonlegislative and, conversely, that courts 
relying on public-focused tests will be more likely to hold that a rule is 
legislative.  This hypothesis is rooted in the different considerations that 
define the scholarship.  Scholars such as McGarity and Elliot,210 for example, 
focus on considerations of efficient rulemaking procedures, presumptions of 
procedural validity, and the benefits of nonlegislative rules.211  These are all 
encompassed in the agency-focused analysis and thus appear to more readily 
support a conclusion that the agency acted permissibly. 
In contrast, the public-focused approach, most notably promoted by 
Professor Anthony, brings to the forefront the concerns and frustrations of a 
regulated public that has been afflicted with new obligations via an 
unchallengeable and private proceeding.212  The create new rights or duties 
test and substantial impact test are particularly apt to capture such 
considerations.  Stated differently, the hypothesis is that courts emphasizing 
the burdens on different parties—agencies or the public—will reach different 
results. 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is important to highlight one 
analytical drawback that this hypothesis introduces.  Namely, because there 
is no uniform test, courts may choose to employ a certain test to support their 
predetermined conclusion and avoid tests that would point in the opposite 
direction.  Testing the hypothesis therefore may not reveal the explanatory 
power of the two approaches, but instead may merely demonstrate that courts 
reference the tests most suitable to their conclusion. 
The concern that courts will cherry-pick factor tests that best fit their 
predetermined conclusion was notably articulated by Justice Scalia.213  He 
argued that judges will chose a test that will produce an outcome “favored by 
the[ir] personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions.”214  In 
the matter of differentiating legislative from nonlegislative rules, the concern 
is even greater given the lack of a standard test between the circuits and even 
within a single circuit.215 
 
 209. Some of the tests appear less frequently in the case law and therefore do not provide 
meaningful inferences from a statistical-analysis standpoint. 
 210. See Elliott, supra note 205, at 1491–94; McGarity, supra note 206, at 1397–99. 
 211. Elliott, supra note 205, at 1491–96. 
 212. See generally Anthony, supra note 22. 
 213. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 747, 754 (2017). 
 214. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 795 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that a multifactor test is more confusing than revealing). 
 215. See supra Part I.B.6. 
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Accordingly, the meaningful difference between the public-focused and 
agency-focused tests can be explained not by the tests’ power to shed light 
on the dispute, but instead by the courts’ predilection to adopt the analysis 
that best suits the panel’s preconceived notions.  Nevertheless, this analysis 
can provide meaningful insights and allows for a simple distinction between 
the tests. 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The focus of this empirical analysis is measuring the effect of using each 
of the six tests when a court is determining whether a rule is legislative or 
nonlegislative.  Specifically, this Note seeks to ascertain whether, by 
employing any of the six tests, a court is more or less likely to find that a rule 
is legislative.  Finally, this Part presents its findings by separating the tests 
into the two identifiable categories of agency-focused tests and public-
focused tests discussed in Part I.C. 
The empirical study covers 241 cases from across the thirteen circuits.  The 
earliest case is from 1952 and the latest is from 2018.  The vast majority of 
the cases were decided after the Court’s seminal decision in Vermont 
Yankee.216  Each of the tests appeared in nearly every circuit.  In 205 cases, 
a court used more than one test.  Overall, the tests appeared a total of 588 
times across all 241 opinions. 
This analysis is organized as follows:  Part II.A outlines the empirical 
study’s methodology.  It details how each test is classified and how the 
database is structured.  Part II.B presents the results from the study of the 241 
cases, Parts II.B.1 through II.B.3 detail patterns in the case law across circuits 
and over time, and Part II.B.4 provides a detailed analysis of the use or 
rejection of each test.  Finally, Part II.B.5 revisits this Note’s hypothesis that 
using public-focused tests increases the likelihood of a finding that a rule is 
legislative. 
A.  Methodology 
The following explains which cases comprise the dataset and how they 
were chosen, and then details how the tests were identified and coded. 
1.  Finding Cases 
The 241 cases in the dataset were mostly located by the following Boolean 
searches on Westlaw:  “‘legislative rule’ OR ‘substantive rule’ & APA OR 
‘Administrative Procedure Act’”; “‘interpretive rule’ OR ‘interpretative rule’ 
& APA OR ‘Administrative Procedure Act’”; “‘general statement of policy’ 
OR ‘policy statement’ & APA OR ‘Administrative Procedure Act’”; 
“‘procedural rule’ OR ‘rule of agency procedure’ & APA OR 
‘Administrative Procedure Act’”. 
 
 216. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (holding that courts may not add additional procedural 
requirements not already outlined in the APA). 
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A minority of the cases did not appear in these searches.  Instead, they 
were discovered in one of three ways:  first, by referring to cases cited in 
court opinions that were found using the Westlaw searches; second, by using 
the Westlaw headnotes feature to find cases citing other opinions; and third, 
by referring to cases cited in scholarly articles. 
In the vast majority of the cases in the database, a petitioner is challenging 
an agency for circumventing the notice-and-comment procedures by 
improperly relying on the APA’s exemptions.217  In a few cases, petitioners 
actually tried to remove themselves from a rule’s coverage by claiming that 
a rule is nonlegislative.218  This difference is meaningful given the 
presumptions about how agencies and plaintiffs frame their arguments.  
Nevertheless, because a court’s analysis is effectively the same in both types 
of cases, they are both considered. 
Finally, cases in the database meet two conditions.  First, these cases were 
decided on the merits.  Challenges resolved on issues such as standing or 
mootness were not coded.  Second, the court’s opinion included some, even 
minimal, analysis of the reasons for determining whether a rule is legislative 
or nonlegislative.  Decisions that affirm or deny a lower court’s 
determination without an explanation were not coded into the study. 
2.  Reciting Precedent or Applying a Test? 
The empirical analysis determines the impact of a court using a particular 
test to find whether or not a rule is legislative.  This invites the question of 
what constitutes “using” a test.  This Note only examines cases that expressly 
rely on one of the six tests.219  Such reliance is manifested by courts’ 
application of one or more of the tests to the facts of a particular dispute 
rather than a mere recitation of a precedent or administrative law principle.220 
3.  Identifying the Tests 
Determining when a court uses a test is fairly simple in three instances.  
First, opinions often refer to the tests by the terminology this Note employs.  
 
 217. See, e.g., Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] filed 
the present action under the [APA] seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Labor . . . from enforcing 
[a regulation] without the Secretary first engaging in notice and comment rulemaking.”); 
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Petitioners] argue that the 
Ashcroft Directive is not a valid agency rule—and thus is not entitled to deference—[because] 
the Attorney General did not promulgate the Ashcroft Directive pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 218. See, e.g., United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2014).  Lott, a convicted 
sex offender, argued that the sentencing guidelines used in his trial were interpretive rules.  
Accordingly, he alleged that the Attorney General improperly relied upon the guidelines as a 
rule with the force and effect of law. Id. 
 219. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (identifying the usage of canons of 
construction by assessing courts’ express reliance on them). 
 220. See, e.g., Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that “the INS policies at issue in this case constitute rules for purposes of the APA”). 
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Examples include:  “[the change had] a substantial impact on the motor 
carrier industry”;221 the Secretary “did not create rights or change existing 
law”;222 and “we find that the agency did not intend to exercise its delegated 
law-making power.”223 
Second, some opinions employ a synonym or an equivalent term for the 
tests.  For example, when the Fourth Circuit referred to the “pursuant to 
statutory delegation” test, it noted:  “the Bureau of Prisons has exercised the 
discretion given to it by Congress.”224  Similarly, when the Tenth Circuit 
used an equivalent of the create new rights or duties test, it noted that the 
“interpretation did not create or alter a legal obligation.”225 
The third instance includes opinions with language that is not an equivalent 
of this Note’s terminology but refers to substantially the same underlying 
principle.  For example, while the Second Circuit did not explicitly use the 
terminology “agency label” in Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery,226 it observed 
that “[t]he January 1990 interim rule is self-described as interpretive.”227 
Each instance of these three categories was coded as using the defined test.  
The more challenging task in this analysis, however, is classifying opinions 
that use more obscure language.  The guiding principle of the methodology 
can be summarized as one of erring on the side of caution.  Therefore, 
opinions that seem to suggest that the court is relying on a particular test, but 
are too vague to draw a clear conclusion, were not included in the dataset.  
Context also guides the analysis.  If a circuit has previously endorsed or 
rejected a certain test, these past decisions informed the determination. 
For example, in Malone v. Bureau of Indian Affairs,228 the Ninth Circuit 
held that a memo characterized by the agency as an interpretive rule was 
instead a legislative rule.229  The court noted that the memo “conclusively 
affect[s] the rights” of individuals like the petitioner.230  A plausible reading 
of this language would indicate that the court is relying on the substantial 
impact test.  However, the court does not mention the test, and the word 
“conclusively” could encompass meanings other than substantial and its 
synonyms.  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has elsewhere rejected the 
substantial impact test in the context of interpretive rules.231  Therefore, the 
analysis does not code Malone as relying on the substantial impact test. 
 
 221. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the 
substantial impact test). 
 222. McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the create new 
rights or duties test). 
 223. La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1179 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying 
the pursuant to statutory delegation test). 
 224. Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 225. Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 226. 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 227. Id. at 745–46. 
 228. 38 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 229. Id. at 438–39. 
 230. Id. at 438 (quoting Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 231. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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B.  Results and Discussion 
The study includes 241 cases from the thirteen circuit courts.  The earliest 
case is from 1952232 and the latest is from July 23, 2018.233  In 205 cases, 
courts used more than one test in their analysis.  Overall, courts mentioned 
one of the six tests 588 times. 
In total, circuit courts found that a rule is legislative in 66 out of 241 cases 
in the database, or in 27.4 percent of challenges to agency rules.  In the 
remaining 175 cases, courts held that the rules were either interpretive rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency procedure. 
Table 1:  Total Holdings: Legislative or Nonlegislative (N = 241) 
 Cases Percentage (%) 
Nonlegislative 175 72.6 
Legislative 66 27.4 
1.  Challenges to Nonlegislative Rules over Time 
Two patterns appear when charting the total number of cases over five 
distinct time periods and the total number of cases in which a rule was held 
legislative. 
Chart 1:  Number of Cases over Time and Percentage of Cases in Which 




 232. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
 233. Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 234. The dark bars represent the total number of cases in the time period.  The lighter bars 
represent the number of cases in which a court held that a rule was legislative.  The percentages 
represent the ratio of the number of findings that a rule was legislative to the number of cases 
within the time period.  Thus, for example, in the decade between 1978 and 1988, there are 
sixty-three cases in the study.  Courts found that a rule was legislative in twenty-three of the 
cases, or 37 percent.   
2152 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
First, the total number of cases on this issue peaked between 1988 and 
1998 and has declined gradually in the two decades since.  Second, the 
percentage of courts holding that a rule is legislative peaked before 1988, 
declined in the period from 1998 to 2008, but has been trending upward in 
the past decade. 
Several factors may help explain these patterns.  First, success on the 
merits may have invited more legal challenges.  Given that over a third of the 
challenges to nonlegislative rules were successful before 1988, observant 
litigants were likely more eager to challenge an agency’s failure to engage in 
notice and comment.  Conversely, the diminished success of these challenges 
in the subsequent decade might have dissuaded similarly situated litigants. 
Second, developments in administrative rulemaking and the perception of 
agency work may have affected overall patterns.  From the significant 
expansion of agency actions during the 1970s,235 a more exacting standard 
of judicial review under the APA of agency decision-making emerged in the 
late 1970s and 1980s.236  This trend could have encouraged litigants to 
challenge agencies in front of more discerning panels. 
Third, the Court’s decisions in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.237 and United States v. Mead Corp.238 may have also 
contributed to the continued decline of challenges in the past two decades.239  
As Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell explained,240 one possible outcome of 
Mead is that agencies may now prefer the more laborious notice-and-
comment rulemaking process to issuing informal guidance.241  Because rules 
promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures will likely receive 
Chevron deference, agencies may be more willing to employ such 
procedures.242 
Finally, the higher ratio of success in the past decade may also be 
influenced by the concern that some politicians243 and commentators244 have 
expressed regarding the “administrative state.”  This renewed attention to and 
concern about unbridled agency action could have motivated a more 
skeptical judicial review of agency action.  Based on past trends, the next 
 
 235. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 896 (explaining that “United States agencies in the 
1970s showed unprecedented interest in rulemaking rather than adjudication”). 
 236. Id. at 897–98. 
 237. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 238. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 239. Note, however, that the sample size is limited and does not account for challenges that 
ended at the district court level.  Accordingly, conclusions from the data should be carefully 
drawn. 
 240. O’Connell, supra note 7, at 522. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Susan E. Dudley, Trump Wants to Deconstruct the Administrative State.  Can He?, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-wants-
deconstruct-administrative-state-can-he-ncna810576 [https://perma.cc/9KZL-HVGV]. 
 244. Chuck DeVore, The Administrative State Is Under Assault and That’s a Good Thing, 
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017, 1:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2017/11/27/the-
administrative-state-is-under-assault-and-thats-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/8PBS-PKBF]. 
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decade could see a similar increase in the number of challenges to agencies 
invoking nonlegislative exemptions. 
2.  Circuit Court Holdings 
Table 2:  Rules Held to Be Legislative by Circuit (N = 241) 
Circuit Total Number of Cases Held Legislative (%) 
First 6 2 (33.3) 
Second 16 5 (31.3) 
Third 16 4 (25.0) 
Fourth 17 5 (29.4) 
Fifth 13 6 (46.2) 
Sixth 15 3 (20.0) 
Seventh 9 1 (11.1) 
Eighth 6 2 (33.3) 
Ninth 44 10 (22.7) 
Tenth 9 0 (0.00) 
Eleventh 6 1 (16.7) 
D.C. 68 23 (33.8) 
Federal 16 4 (25.0) 
 
Because circuits other than the Ninth and the D.C. Circuit have decided 
relatively few cases, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions or patterns 
from circuit court holdings.  Indeed, a regression analysis indicates that only 
the Tenth Circuit offers statistically significant data.  
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Table 3:  Regression Analysis:  Differentiating Rules by Circuit 
(N = 241)245 
Circuit Held Legislative 
First -.09 (.18) 
Second -.06 (.12) 
Third -.11 (.12) 
Fourth -.05 (.12) 
Fifth .01 (.13) 
Sixth -.14 (.12) 
Seventh -.09 (.15) 
Eighth -.01 (.18) 
Ninth -.13 (.08) 
Tenth** -.35 (.15) 
Eleventh -.13 (.18) 
D.C.* .18 (.09) 
Federal -.10 (.12) 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, few meaningful inferences can be drawn by 
testing a specific circuit’s likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative.  On 
the one hand, this lack of significance is perhaps attributable to courts’ 
inability to fashion a cohesive test and the field’s changing consensus on the 
proper tests to be employed.  On the other hand, and perhaps more 
encouragingly, this could also indicate that courts are indeed conducting a 
neutral case-by-case analysis, and therefore their rulings are unrelated to the 
court’s predisposition to side with or against an agency. 
A notable exception, however, is the Tenth Circuit, which the analysis 
indicates is 35 percent more likely to side with an agency and hold that a rule 
is nonlegislative.  Although this result is statistically significant, the Tenth 
Circuit only heard nine cases on the issue and therefore had fewer 
opportunities to reach a different result. 
3.  Number of Tests Considered 
In the 241 cases, the tests were invoked 588 times.  In Table 4, the leftmost 
column represents the number of tests an opinion expressly relied upon.  
Thus, in 34 cases, the court relied on only 1 test; in 109 cases, the court relied 
on 2 tests; and so on.  The “Held Legislative” column represents the number 
 
 245. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  Robust standard errors appear in parentheses next 
to coefficients.  The base category for comparison is no effect, (-1) represents a finding that a 
rule is nonlegislative, and (+1) represents that a rule is legislative.  This Note follows the 
traditional social-science approach to regression results, where a p value of .05 or less 
indicates a statistically significant result. See RAND WILCOX, MODERN STATISTICS FOR THE 
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 147 (2d ed. 2017). 
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of times a court held that a rule was legislative rather than nonlegislative.  
Therefore, from the 34 cases in which the court relied on one test, it found 
the rule was legislative in eight of the cases. 
Table 4:  Number of Tests Relied Upon (N = 588) 
Number of Tests Used Cases Held Legislative (%) 
1 34 8 (23.5) 
2 109 28 (25.9) 
3 60 18 (30) 
4 30 12 (40) 
5 7 0 (0) 
6 1 0 (0) 
 
Increasing the number of tests considered in a given case does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of finding that a rule is 
legislative. 
Table 5:  Statistical Significance of Number of Tests Relied Upon (N = 588) 
 Held Legislative 
Number of tests considered .01 (.03) 
 
The regression in Table 5 measures the impact of increasing the number 
of tests considered—from one to six—on a court’s likelihood of finding that 
a rule is legislative.  Increasing the number of tests considered in a given case 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of finding that 
a rule is legislative.  This is perhaps rooted in three reasons.  First, courts may 
dismiss “weaker” challenges where the panel decides a rule is nonlegislative, 
and therefore the panel does not need to engage in a lengthy discussion that 
differentiates legislative from nonlegislative rules.246  Conversely, courts 
perhaps provide a more detailed analysis, including multiple tests, to better 
justify why an agency action is permissible under the APA in challenges that 
appear more meritorious.  Finally, it is also possible that considering more 
tests increases the suspicion that an agency acted impermissibly.  As it relates 
to the public-focused and agency-focused analysis, perhaps courts 
considering tests from both approaches are able to better scrutinize an 
 
 246. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a rule is interpretive in a brief paragraph: 
An interpretive rule is one “issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s 
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.”  We agree with the 
district court that [the rule] “advises the public of the DOI’s construction of [the 
statute]” . . . and hence that notice and comment were not required. 
United States v. Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp. (In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp.), 111 
F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (first quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 
99 (1995)). 
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agency’s action.  In sum, however, increasing the number of tests considered 
has no bearing on the likely success of a challenge to an agency rule. 
4.  The Six Tests 
This Note seeks to determine whether using any one of the six tests affects 
the likelihood that a court will find that a rule is legislative.  The following 
discussion details the patterns the study found about the six tests. 
Table 6:  Overall Frequency for Each Test in the Database (N = 241) 
Test Cases % Used 
Agency Label 86 35.68 
Clarification 151 62.66 
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation 62 25.73 
Agency Binding 65 26.97 
Create New Rights or Duties 184 76.35 
Substantial Impact 40 16.60 
 
From 1952 until 2018, the most prominent test in the case law has been the 
create new rights or duties test, which appears in 184 out of 241 cases.  Also 
appearing in over half of the cases is the clarification test.  Charting and 
plotting test usage throughout the years demonstrates some of the trends in 
the analysis. 
Graph 1:  Test Appearance over Time247 
 
 
Graph 1 demonstrates developments and trends in the case law over time.  
First, the create new rights or duties test and clarification test are persistently 
the most prominent tests.  Second, the pursuant to statutory authority test 
 
 247. AL = Agency Label; CL = Clarification; PSD = Pursuant to Statutory Delegation; 
AB = Agency Binding; CNR = Create New Rights or Duties; SI = Substantial Impact. 
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increased in appearance in the decade between 1988 and 1998.  This is 
perhaps explained by the Supreme Court’s 1984 holding in Chevron, which 
focused on congressional delegation to an agency as the first step of its 
analysis.248  Third, the substantial impact test has been steadily decreasing in 
appearance since the early 1980s. 
Tables 7 and 8 below represent the key findings of this Note:  the effects 
of using one of the six tests in a court’s determination of whether a rule is 
legislative or nonlegislative. 
These tables represent the results of the following regression analysis.  The 
independent variable is the test considered.  The base category for 
comparison is no effect.  Table 7 is a simple regression model with the test 
considered as an independent variable, and whether the rule was held as 
legislative (+1) or nonlegislative (-1) as the dependent variable.249  Thus, for 
example, a court using the agency label test is 10 percent less likely to find 
that a rule is legislative or, conversely, 10 percent more likely to find that a 
rule is nonlegislative.  Table 8 introduces two additional control variables to 
the regression:  circuit court and time period.250 
Table 7:  Simple Model:  Tests Considered and Finding that an Agency 
Rule is Legislative (N = 241) 
Test Simple Model  
Agency Label* -.10 (.06) 
Clarification*** -.19 (.06) 
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation .03 (.12) 
Agency Binding .05 (.06) 
Create New Rights or Duties*** .27 (.06) 
Substantial Impact** .16 (.07) 
Table 8:  Control Model:  Tests Considered and Finding that an Agency 
Rule is Legislative (N = 241) 
Test Control Model 
Agency Label** -.13 (.06) 
Clarification*** -.18 (.06) 
Pursuant to Statutory Delegation .04 (.07) 
Agency Binding .02 (.07) 
Create New Rights or Duties*** .27 (.09) 
Substantial Impact .11 (.08) 
 
 248. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 249. The dependent variable is binary, with (-1) representing a finding that a rule is 
nonlegislative and (+1) representing a finding that a rule is legislative. 
 250. The circuit court variable includes the thirteen circuits.  The time periods are defined 
as pre-1978, 1978–1988, 1988–1998, 1998–2008, 2008–2018. 
2158 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
Part II.B.4.a through Part II.B.4.f below analyze the study’s results for 
each of the tests. 
a.  Agency Label 
The agency label test is statistically significant when introducing the 
circuit court and time period control variables and falls slightly short of the 
statistically significant threshold in the simple regression model. 
Relying on Table 8, a court using the agency label test will be 13 percent 
more likely to find that a rule is nonlegislative and that the agency action is 
permissible.  This result is perhaps explained by the premise that some courts 
have outlined when relying on this test:  there is a presumption of procedural 
validity when the court reviews an agency action.251  Thus construed, the 
agency label test appears to encapsulate a limited role for the court in 
checking agency action.  This presumption, which has been increasingly 
reiterated by the Supreme Court, perhaps also explains why controlling for 
time periods in Table 8 increases the significance of the agency label test. 
Connor Raso’s analysis of the court’s role in administrative law is 
insightful here.252  Technically, three entities may punish agencies for 
procedurally defective process:  the president, Congress, and the courts.253  
As Raso notes, however, the first two entities rarely take up that mantle,254 
and courts are left as the sole barrier between the agency’s will and the 
affected public. 
Given that role, judges who explicitly acknowledge that an agency has 
labeled a rule nonlegislative and then proceed to hold that a rule is legislative, 
find themselves in the position of having to tell an agency:  “you are lying.”  
Meaning, if the court holds that a rule is legislative even though the agency 
labeled it as nonlegislative, the court is in fact holding that the agency has 
misled the president and Congress and has attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
mislead the court. 
Indeed, any determination that the agency failed to follow notice-and-
comment procedures carries such implications.  But when judges recite in 
detail the agency’s actions, such as an administrator’s pronouncement that a 
rule is nonlegislative, they make their disagreements more pronounced and 
place the court in a seemingly more activist position. 
In sum, the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that considering the agency 
label increases the likelihood that the court will agree with the agency and 
hold that the rule did not violate the notice-and-comment provisions of the 
APA.  This is explained both by the presumption of procedural validity that 
 
 251. See, e.g., United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 252. Raso, supra note 22, at 90. 
 253. Id. at 80. 
 254. Recently, however, the Trump administration appears to be challenging that 
proposition. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Att’y Gen., on Prohibition on 
Improper Guidance Documents 1 (Nov. 16, 2017). 
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courts confer on agencies and by courts’ unwillingness to check an agency 
and hold that it has attempted to deceive the courts. 
b.  Clarification 
In both regression models, the clarification test is statistically significant 
and increases the likelihood of a finding that a rule is legislative by 19 percent 
and 18 percent, according to Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. 
This result appears to support the concern that Judge Nygaard expressed255 
when rejecting his colleagues’ use of the clarification test—nearly all 
regulations in some way explain or clarify an existing rule.256  Accordingly, 
and under an expansive definition of the clarification test,257 agencies may 
always successfully contend that a rule is interpretive and does not violate 
the APA.258  This definition also finds support in American Mining Congress, 
which emphasized that a rule may be interpretive even if it “supplies crisper 
and more detailed lines” than an existing rule.259 
A recent decision that relies on Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n 
illustrates the implications of broadly construing the clarification test.  In 
Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Huerta,260 a flight attendants’ union sued the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for violating the APA.  For decades, 
the FAA had recommended that passengers be allowed to use electronic 
devices during the main portion of the flight261 but not during takeoff and 
landing.262  In 2013, however, the FAA issued a notice informing its safety 
inspectors that the agency need not approve an airline’s finding that 
passengers may use personal electronic devices during all parts of the 
flight.263  Soon after, the flight attendants’ union sued the agency for 
improperly promulgating a legislative rule.264  At the core of the union’s 
argument was that the 2013 notice amended a prior regulation and therefore 
should not be considered an interpretive rule.265 
The D.C. Circuit disagreed.266  The court explained that agencies may 
freely issue interpretations that do not amend the underlying regulations they 
interpret.267  As applied to the union’s challenge, the guidance documents 
 
 255. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 256. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Nygaard, J., dissenting). 
 257. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 258. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
 259. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 260. 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 261. Id. at 714.  This was the FAA’s interpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 121.306(b)(5), which 
recommended that airlines permit use of any device so long as the device does not interfere 
with aircraft systems. Id. at 713–14. 
 262. Id. at 714. 
 263. Id. at 715. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 717–19. 
 267. Id. at 713. 
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may have created new recommendations that aviation safety inspectors could 
follow, but they did not create new law that amended a previous 
regulation.268  The court relied on the arguments set forth in Perez, which 
explained the difference between amending and interpreting a rule.269  Under 
this framework, it is likely that a new interpretation of a regulation, which 
produces different effects on the regulated public, would be sustained as an 
interpretive rule and therefore exempt from notice and comment. 
In sum, the expansive definition of an interpretive rule, which American 
Mining Congress established270 and Perez overwhelmingly endorsed,271 
allows agencies to successfully argue that a new interpretation clarifies a 
regulation and is therefore permissible.  If the two decisions are taken to their 
logical extremes, it is, as Judge Nygaard warned, difficult to conceive of any 
interpretation that would not be sustained under the clarification test.272  
Further, if interpretive rules are construed as beneficial agency actions that 
serve the regulated public, courts may be more willing to accept an agency 
rule that modifies an existing regulation so long as the agency couches it as 
an interpretive rule and finds shelter under the umbrella of the APA’s 
exemptions. 
c.  Pursuant to Statutory Delegation 
In both regression models, the pursuant to statutory delegation test is not 
statistically significant.  This result supports the Seventh Circuit’s 
characterization of the test as lacking in explanatory power:  “[this test] 
returns us to the starting point . . . what kind of rule does the agency think it 
has promulgated?”273  Stated differently, because most agencies have the 
delegated power to issue both legislative and nonlegislative rules, the test 
reveals little about the true nature of an agency’s challenged action.274  Given 
the test’s seeming tendency to confirm a decision rather than aid in its 
formulation, the cases below demonstrate how courts have referred to the test 
and have arrived at different conclusions. 
On the one hand, some courts find specific legislative authority to support 
an inference that an agency issued legislative rules.  In Sweet v. Sheahan,275 
for example, the Second Circuit held that an EPA rule regulating lead paint 
was legislative, in part because it was “promulgated pursuant to the explicit 
statutory authority of the Lead-Based Paint Act.”276  Likewise, the D.C. 
Circuit explained that the DOL “enjoys delegated authority to prescribe rules 
 
 268. Id. at 718. 
 269. Id. at 713 (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (2015)). 
 270. Am. Mining Cong. v. Health & Safety Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109–12 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 271. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206–09 (2015). 
 272. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Nygaard, J., dissenting). 
 273. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 274. See, e.g., La.-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 275. 235 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 276. Id. at 92. 
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with the force of law”277 and, regarding the specific issue in the case, that it 
was “authorized to promulgate legislative rules governing unemployment 
statistics.”278  Accordingly, the court held that the DOL’s action “cannot be 
merely an interpretative rule.”279 
On the other hand, courts have relied on an agency’s lack of authority to 
regulate specific matters to hold that a rule is nonlegislative.  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that a DOL rule was interpretive because the congressional 
delegation only allowed the DOL to issue interpretive rules.280  In another 
challenge to the DOL, the First Circuit held that the agency action constituted 
an interpretive rule in part because it was within the Secretary’s authority to 
formulate rules in administering the statute.281  Thus, the pursuant to 
statutory delegation test does not appear to influence a court’s finding in 
either direction.  Instead, it seems to serve as an added justification for a 
decision reached on other merits. 
d.  Agency Binding 
The agency binding test is not statistically significant under either 
regression model, and the empirical analysis does not point to any 
determinative impact that follows from considering this test.  This is 
surprising given that commentators have cautioned that using the agency 
binding test will have several deleterious effects.282 
This result is perhaps explained by the limited number of occasions in 
which courts have considered this test,283 nearly always in the context of 
general statements of policy.  But perhaps the reason is more fundamental.  
Weighing this test typically entails questioning whether the agency bound 
itself to reach a particular result in adjudication or enforcement actions:  an 
elusive distinction to draw. 
For example, in National Ass’n of Broadcasters v. F.C.C.,284 the D.C. 
Circuit held that an FCC directive was not a legislative rule because it did 
not force the Commission to reach a particular result in any case.285  But the 
same circuit rejected a similar argument a few years earlier.  In General 
Electric Co. v. EPA,286 the court held that a guidance document was a 
legislative rule even though the EPA had maintained that the document did 
not force the agency to reach a particular result in any case.287  Instead, the 
 
 277. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 278. Id. at 706. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 281. Nason v. Kennebec Cty. CETA, 646 F.2d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 282. Brief of Administrative Law Scholars, supra note 149, at 16–17. 
 283. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 284. 569 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 285. Id. at 426. 
 286. 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 287. Id. at 384–85. 
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court determined that the agency “will not be open to considering approaches 
other than those prescribed in the Document.”288 
As the two cases demonstrate, whether a certain document is binding on 
an agency is a difficult line to draw and appears to support an “I-call-it-when-
I-see-it” type of reasoning.  That, in addition to the theoretical shortfalls that 
litigants289 and the First Circuit and Federal Circuit articulated,290 lend 
support to the criticism of this test. 
e.  Create New Rights or Duties 
In both regression models, the create new rights or duties test is statistically 
significant; using the test increases the likelihood of finding that a rule is 
legislative by 27 percent.  This impact, combined with the frequency with 
which the test appears in opinions, renders it the most critical test in the 
legislative versus nonlegislative rules debate. 
The dominance of the create new rights or duties test is perhaps explained 
by its ability to “catch” different instances in which the agency, by mistake 
or design, binds members of the public and alters the regulatory landscape.  
A rigid construction of this distinction, as in the case of Xin-Chang Zhang v. 
Slattery below, results in a more forceful limitation on an agency’s power to 
issue nonlegislative rules.291 
In Xin-Chang Zhang, the Second Circuit determined that a self-proclaimed 
interpretive rule by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was 
legislative and failed to comply with the APA.292  Until 1990, the INS had 
held that China’s “one couple, one child” rule was not, alone, a sufficient 
basis for granting asylum.293  But that year the agency issued an interim 
rule—described as interpretive—stating that refugee status may be conferred 
on the sole basis of an applicant’s objection to China’s “one child” policy.294  
That change, the Second Circuit held, “create[d] a new basis on which aliens 
may be granted refugee status; it change[d] an existing policy.”295  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the interim rule was legislative.296  
This holding flowed from the court’s description of the proper way to 
distinguish legislative from nonlegislative rules:  “In distinguishing between 
the two types of rules, the central question is essentially whether an 
agency . . . create[d] new law, rights, or duties.”297 
This result is particularly striking considering that the Fourth Circuit, 
analyzing the same rule but using a different test, reached a different 
 
 288. Id. at 384. 
 289. See supra note 148. 
 290. Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82–83 (1st Cir. 1998); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 291. 55 F.3d 732, 745–47 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 292. Id. at 747. 
 293. Id. at 739. 
 294. Id. at 745–46. 
 295. Id. at 746. 
 296. Id. at 747. 
 297. Id. at 745. 
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conclusion.  In Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,298 the petitioner argued that in 
considering his asylum request, the INS failed to follow the interim rule and 
therefore improperly denied his request.299  Unlike in Xin-Chang Zhang, 
however, the Chen Zhou Chai court considered whether the rule was a 
general statement of policy.300  This, in turn, prompted the court to analyze 
the interim rule under the agency binding test rather than the create new rights 
or duties test.301  Thus, instead of asking, as the Second Circuit did, whether 
the interim rule bound the public, the Fourth Circuit asked whether the rule 
bound the agency.302 
The court explained that “[a] rule is a general statement of policy if it does 
not establish a binding norm and leaves agency officials free to exercise their 
discretion.”303  It held that because the agency could still reach different 
results, the interim rule did not bind the agency and was exempt from the 
APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.304  As the conflicting results and the 
statistical analysis indicate, reliance on the create new rights or duties test 
can meaningfully affect a court’s inquiry. 
But the test’s influence should not be overstated.  Less than an overly strict 
application of the test305 often leads to a finding that an agency acted properly 
even when it shifted the regulatory landscape.306  Moreover, it is doubtful 
whether, in light of Perez, the Second Circuit would have reached a similar 
result today.  Accordingly, the create new rights or duties test’s continued 
dominance is somewhat in doubt. 
f.  Substantial Impact 
The substantial impact test is statistically significant in the simple model 
but not in the control model, which includes control variables for time periods 
and circuit courts.  The lack of significance in the control model is perhaps 
explained by the test’s dominance in the Fifth Circuit, and its greater regard 
prior to the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee decision in 1978, which 
established that courts may not add procedural restrictions not contemplated 
by Congress in the APA.307  While circuits gradually rejected the test 
 
 298. 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 299. Id. at 1335. 
 300. Id. at 1341. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See, e.g., A.D. Transp. Express, Inc. v. United States, 290 F.3d 761, 768 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
 306. See, e.g., Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 680 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
 307. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
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entirely308 or in part,309 the Fifth Circuit continued to apply it.310  And 
because that circuit has a higher rate of finding that a rule is legislative 
overall, it is likely that controlling for the circuit reduces the significance of 
the test’s explanatory power. 
Still, Table 7 indicates that a court employing the substantial impact test 
increases the likelihood of it finding that a rule is legislative by 16 percent.  
This result supports the notion, or concern, that weighing whether an agency 
action has a substantial impact on the regulated public would more often than 
not demonstrate that an action has a substantial impact. 
But it is noteworthy that despite these explanatory pitfalls, the substantial 
impact test is less determinative of a court’s resolution of a notice-and-
comment exemption challenge than the create new rights or duties test.311  
This is surprising given the considerable number of scholars312 and courts313 
who maintain that the substantial impact test would produce outcomes overly 
burdensome to agencies. 
5.  Public-Focused Tests vs. Agency-Focused Tests 
Lastly, the empirical analysis tests the hypothesis that relying on public-
focused tests increases the likelihood of a court finding that a rule is 
legislative.  To review, the agency-focused tests include:  agency label, 
clarification, pursuant to statutory delegation, and agency binding.  The 
public-focused tests are the create new rights or duties and substantial impact 
tests.  In both regression models, the two categories are statistically 
significant. 
Table 9:  Agency-Focused vs. Public-Focused Analysis (N = 241) 
Tests Held Legislative Under Simple Model 
Held Legislative 
Under Control Model 
Agency-Focused -.23*** (.09) -.24*** (.06) 
Public-Focused  .27*** (.07) .27*** (.07) 
 
Under the control model, using agency-focused tests reduces the 
likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative by 24 percent, while public-
focused tests increase that likelihood by 27 percent.  These results support 
the initial hypothesis and are also compatible with the findings of the create 
new rights or duties and clarification tests in particular. 
 
 308. See supra notes 167–78. 
 309. See Caribbean Produce Exch., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 3, 8 
(1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983)). 
 310. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text; see also Shell Offshore Inc. v. 
Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 630 (5th Cir. 2001); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 
620 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on denial of reh’g en banc, No. 93-1377, 1994 WL 484506 (5th 
Cir. Sept. 7, 1994). 
 311. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 312. Levin, supra note 3, at 289–90. 
 313. See supra notes 167–78. 
2019] LEGISLATIVE VERSUS NONLEGISLATIVE RULES 2165 
The difference between the two modes of analysis, focusing on the agency 
or focusing on the public, captures a fundamental debate in administrative 
law:  What is the proper balance between burdening agencies with procedural 
rules on the one hand, and usurping public participation from the process on 
the other?314  Another way to frame this question is to ask how much burden 
the public should endure in exchange for efficient and effective agency work?  
The results in Table 9 appear to suggest that the answers to these questions 
are reflected in judges’ determinations of whether a rule is legislative or 
nonlegislative. 
III.  REFINING THE IMPERFECT TEST 
Administrative law scholars have articulated several proposals for the 
proper test.315  In the 1990s, some scholars tended to endorse one of the six 
tests used by courts or to offer a refinement to one of those tests.316  Other 
scholars, however, have ventured to suggest more novel approaches, such as 
dismissing this inquiry entirely and allowing an agency to promulgate 
nonlegislative rules when it labels them as such.317 
This Note prefers a more conservative approach:  using a combined public-
focused and agency-focused test.  Specifically, using the clarification test and 
create new rights or duties test together will help elucidate the agency’s 
intent, the rule’s impact, and consequently its proper classification.  These 
recommendations are informed by this Note’s qualitative and empirical 
analyses.  As the qualitative portion demonstrated, the clarification test and 
create new rights or duties test each offer a powerful analytical framework.318 
Further, the empirical analysis demonstrates not only that these tests are 
the most widely used tools but also that they meaningfully increase or 
decrease a court’s likelihood of finding that a rule is legislative or 
nonlegislative.319  A balanced approach, then, could help to arrive at the most 
neutral test. 
Accordingly, this Note endorses the use of both the clarification and create 
new rights or duties tests by courts.  To resolve further ambiguity, this Note 
also calls for a narrow substantial impact test.  Finally, this Note suggests 
that the agency label test be removed from the analysis entirely. 
A.  Balancing Agency-Focused and Public-Focused Tests 
As Part II.B.5 indicates, adopting either the agency-focused or public-
focused approach contributes to the result the court reaches in differentiating 
 
 314. See Asimow, supra note 41, at 533–34. 
 315. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 286–86 (analyzing some of the proposed tests or 
modifications to existing approaches). 
 316. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 2, at 559–61. 
 317. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 205, at 1490.  Elliott frames his suggestion as rooted in 
“a fundamental tenet of administrative law, crucial to maintaining the proper balance between 
courts and agencies, that an agency’s action is what it says it is.” Id. 
 318. See supra Parts II.B.4.b, II.B.4.e. 
 319. Supra Part II.B.4. 
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legislative from nonlegislative rules.320  The case law and literature 
highlighted throughout this Note provide several reasons for this result.321  
But in short, and on an abstract level, an agency-focused analysis highlights 
the challenges of administrative rulemaking procedures,322 and a public-
focused analysis places great weight on the adverse impact a regulation has 
on the public.323  From these different approaches, courts seem to draw 
different conclusions. 
But to reach a result that best captures the principles of the APA,324 courts 
should adopt elements of both.  As one circuit aptly noted:  “Inevitably, in 
determining whether the APA requires notice and comment rulemaking, the 
interests of agency efficiency and public input are in tension.”325  
Accordingly, an analysis that overly emphasizes one of these interests would 
more readily arrive at the conclusion that best supports one of these 
considerations. 
Adopting an analysis that includes elements of both public-focused and 
agency-focused tests would not immunize a court from scrutiny around 
injecting certain biases about the proper role and function of agencies into its 
analysis of a particular dispute.  But it would push, or at least lightly nudge, 
the reviewing court to grapple with justifications from both categories and 
employ a more equitable analysis.  Though some scholars prefer to look 
outside of the established realm of case law to fashion a proper test,326 it is 
possible to improve the current approach within the established tests.  The 
following sections suggest which modifications should be introduced. 
B.  Balancing the Create New Rights or Duties and Clarification Tests 
The create new rights or duties test and clarification test complement and 
inform each other.  An agency action may clarify a regulation, create new 
rights or duties, or accomplish both.  Employing these tests assists courts by 
demonstrating both the agency’s intended effect and the actual impact an 
action has on the public.  This, in turn, provides the court with a greater 
understanding of the rule’s proper classification under the APA.  A Sixth 
 
 320. Supra Part II.B.4. 
 321. Supra Parts I.B, II.B.3. 
 322. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 
1990) (“The Secretary’s role is . . . to apply the statutory standard to an enormous number of 
modern medical practices.”). 
 323. Compare Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613–14 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[P]enalizing the 
agency for explaining what was for the plaintiffs the bad news . . . would be like killing the 
messenger.”), with Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (“There 
are thousands of animal dealers, and some unknown fraction of these face the prospect of 
having to tear down their existing fences . . . .  The concerns of these dealers are 
legitimate . . . .”). 
 324. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950); see also Posner, supra 
note 45, at 953–54 (describing the APA as a compromise between competing views on the 
function of administrative agencies). 
 325. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 326. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1720–
21 (2007); Manning, supra note 74, at 929. 
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Circuit case, Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice,327 
illustrates some of the merits of this proposition. 
In Dismas Charities, an operator of private detention centers challenged a 
DOJ amendment to its previous regulations as a legislative rule.328  
Specifically, the case concerned the Imprisonment of a Convicted Person 
Act.329  The provision giving rise to the dispute stated that the DOJ could 
place prisoners in any facility that met the DOJ’s “minimum standards.”330  
In 1992, the DOJ determined that private facilities met these standards and, 
accordingly, allowed certain classes of prisoners to be placed in them.331  But 
a decade later, the DOJ issued a memorandum that rendered imprisonment 
of certain classes of prisoners in private facilities unlawful.332  This change, 
the court agreed, had a severe impact on corporations such as the plaintiffs 
in the case.333 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held that the memorandum is a 
paradigmatic example of an interpretive rule.334  It reasoned that the 
memorandum interpreted the statute and, based on that interpretation, 
concluded that the DOJ’s previous position was unlawful.335  The memo’s 
impact notwithstanding, the court held that the DOJ acted properly and that 
this action was exempt from notice and comment.336 
While the court’s certainty that the rule was interpretive is perhaps 
overstated, the holding is justified.  It was within the DOJ’s power to 
determine what it could lawfully do under the statute, and the court’s 
conclusion that the agency did not need to undergo notice-and-comment 
rulemaking was therefore reasonable.  Public input, the court reasoned, is 
neither necessary nor helpful to determine “what the law already is.”337  The 
court was able to reach this conclusion by considering both the rule’s impact 
on the public and the agency’s capacity to interpret a statute. 
Compare this sensible reasoning to a district court that analyzed the same 
memorandum but came to the opposite conclusion.338  The district court held 
that the DOJ violated the APA because it did not afford affected parties an 
opportunity to participate in the process.339  The court’s decision is curious 
because it leaves agencies powerless to engage in proper and useful 
interpretive actions.  Instead, it significantly narrows an agency’s ability to 
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issue the type of interpretive rules that the APA exempts from notice-and-
comment procedures. 
These two cases illustrate why considering both factors can be 
illuminating.  Since agency actions often both clarify a regulation and 
establish new rights or duties, adopting both tests enables courts to strike the 
balance between proper and efficient agency action on the one hand, and 
impermissible actions that bind the public on the other. 
C.  Disposing of the Agency Label Test 
The agency label test has some appeal, especially in its capacity to afford 
a presumption of validity to agency operation.340  Nevertheless, this test’s 
significant shortcomings necessitate its removal from a proper analysis.  
Most worryingly, the logic of the agency label test is circular.  Courts 
considering it an indication of the disputed rule’s proper classification 
effectively adopt the following position:  The agency’s rule is nonlegislative 
because the agency labeled it as nonlegislative.  And the agency labeled it as 
nonlegislative because the rule is nonlegislative.341 
It is true that most courts analyze other tests and do not justify their 
conclusions on this test alone.342  However, even those courts arguing that 
the inquiry is a “starting point” introduce an ill-advised consideration into the 
inquiry.343  Not only does it produce circular reasoning, it also places undue 
emphasis on an element that is already embedded in the analysis.  The 
agency’s classification of the rule is well-known:  the petitioner is 
challenging it. 
Finally, one key argument for the test is that it captures certain 
presumptions of valid agency actions that permeate administrative law.344  
Agencies, after all, have been delegated authority because of their expertise, 
and it is therefore justified, if not necessary, to afford them this presumption.  
But this rationale is best suited for instances in which courts are asked to 
inquire whether an agency action is substantively reasonable.  In the context 
of the APA, and specifically in applying the exemptions from the notice-and-
comment procedures, these presumptions are misguided. 
First, courts, unlike agencies, are neutral arbiters in determining whether 
an agency’s procedure was valid.  Second, the APA—as manifested in its 
text and legislative history—is undoubtedly concerned with procedural 
 
 340. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 341. See, e.g., United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) 
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 342. Supra Part II.B.2. 
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validity.345  Accordingly, when courts assess procedural validity they are 
firmly within their expertise and congressional mandate.  They do not wade 
into the substantive territory that agencies dominate.  The agency label test 
is therefore better left to nonprocedural inquiries and should not inform the 
analysis when distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules. 
D.  Narrowing the Substantial Impact Test 
Courts who venture into the substantial impact analysis flirt with the 
temptation to establish additional procedural requirements on agencies 
beyond the scope of the APA.346  The Supreme Court has, on several 
occasions, warned about such practices,347 and accordingly, courts have 
gradually shifted away from the test.348  But this inquiry can be informative 
and still remain within the confines of the APA. 
A Second Circuit case, Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC,349 illustrates some 
of the justifications of the substantial impact inquiry.  Commensurate with 
the rise in popularity of cable television, Congress and the FCC were 
concerned that telecom companies were engaging in anticompetitive 
practices.350  Specifically, regulators worried that cable operators, such as 
Time Warner Cable, were taking “unfair advantage” of their market 
dominance when negotiating with programming networks, such as CNN or 
ESPN.351  As part of the effort to combat this practice, the FCC established 
a regulatory regime under which programming networks could challenge 
anticompetitive behavior by cable operators.352 
In 2011, without notice and comment procedures, the FCC published a 
“standstill rule,” which required that, in the case of a dispute between 
programming networks and cable operators, the latter must continue to 
broadcast content from the former until the FCC settles the dispute.353  Time 
Warner sued, arguing that the rule is legislative, and the Second Circuit 
agreed.  The court explained that “all procedural rules affect substantive 
rights to some extent.”354  Accordingly, the proper distinction between those 
rules that are legislative and those that are exempt from notice and comment 
is “one of degree depending upon whether the substantive effect is 
sufficiently grave so that notice and comment are needed to safeguard the 
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policies underlying the APA.”355  Applying this rationale to the facts, the 
court found that the rule was legislative because it “significantly affect[ed] 
substantive rights.”356  This significant impact, the court concluded, is 
precisely the effect which the APA sought to curb by allowing public 
participation.357 
As this case demonstrates, often an agency and petitioner both raise 
concerns and justifications that are reasonable and can be aptly supported by 
the existing tests.  What the substantial impact test allows, then, is to 
determine whether an agency action created the types of burdens the framers 
of the APA sought to curb.  The substantial impact test, used when other tests 
fail to point to the proper classification, can thus be illuminating for courts. 
CONCLUSION 
A way forward in the pursuit of a proper demarcating line between 
legislative and nonlegislative rules is to consider both the clarification and 
create new rights or duties tests.  This balanced public-focused and agency-
focused approach provides a test that is able to capture the procedural 
concerns giving rise to the APA while also embracing agency reliance on 
nonlegislative rules, even when these impact the public.  In cases where this 
distinction produces ambiguous results, the substantial impact test could 
provide an informative analysis. 
Scholars who propose that we do away with any of the six tests offer 
persuasive reasoning.  They rightly contend that the tests, in their various 
formulations, do not answer the question of what rule’s “true” nature is.  The 
approach this Note offers does not resolve every question, and the test is 
bound to remain imperfect.  But a cohesive, balanced framework could, 
without disregarding decades of precedent and experience, make this inquiry 
more uniform, perceptive, and actionable for both courts and agencies. 
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